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This memorandum provides a scenario analysis of the likely macroeconomic impacts of a 
limited foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in New Zealand.  It is worth stressing at the 
outset that it is not a forecast, nor a ‘central’ scenario, but an exercise to gauge broad 
magnitudes and to trace through the likely shocks to several key macro variables based on a 
set of plausible events.   
 
In any projection there are uncertainties to deal with, but there are more than usual in this 
exercise.  Factors that are crucial in determining the magnitude of the economic impact – 
such as trading partner reactions to trade resumption, the spread, containment, and eradication 
of the outbreak, and the second round effects on the financial sector – are not explicitly 
captured by our models, nor are there any directly relevant precedents to guide us.
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In our scenario the cumulative loss in nominal GDP is around $6 billion after 1 year, and 
around $10 billion after 2 years.3  The loss will continue to increase because potential output 
is permanently lower.  This is twice as large as the initial MAF estimate, but is explained by 
the additional macroeconomic effects such as the slump in domestic demand, and by 
accounting for limited storage capacity and trading partner behaviour.  What is not accounted 
for is the impact of such an event on the financial sector.  It is expected, however, that taking 
these effects into account would mean that the impact on the economy would be larger 
(although the significant monetary policy easing would limit the impact to some extent by 
making debt servicing easier and so on). 
 
Table 1: cumulative impact on exports and nominal GDP  
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 
Cumulative 





% of annual 
nominal 
exports 
-3 -5 -6 -8 -10 -12  -12  -12
Cumulative 





% of annual 
nominal 
GDP 
-1 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -8
                                                 
1 The authors of this report were Aron Gereben and Ian Woolford from the RBNZ, and Melleny Black from the 
Treasury.  We thank Ashley Lienert, Bernard Hodgetts, Renee Philip, and Angela Huang from the RBNZ, and 
the Tax Forecasting team and Bruce White from the Treasury for their work on the modelling scenarios and for 
drafting the technical paper that this report has drawn on.   
2 The macroeconomic scenario was created using the Reserve Bank’s Forecasting and Policy System (FPS), and 
the fiscal impact modelling was carried out using the Composite version of the Treasury’s Long Term Fiscal 
Model. 
3 A large part of the reduction in nominal GDP is the result of lower inflation.  Real GDP is only 3.5 billion 




The scenario was based on the assumption of an FMD outbreak that initially occurs in pigs 
through waste food, and then spreads from pigs to sheep or cattle. The outbreak is contained 
within the North Island, allowing trade from the South Island to resume earlier, and farmers 
do not vaccinate the animals.  
 
In order to simulate this outbreak scenario in a highly aggregated macroeconomic model such 
as FPS, we specified shocks in the main macroeconomic variables (export volumes and 
prices, exchange rate, wealth, risk premium etc.) that are broadly consistent with our 




The impact on dairy export is assumed to be rather muted.  Dairy products are mainly 
unaffected by the FMD, however, trading partners would impose an export ban for a 
relatively short period.  We assumed that dairy exports effectively stop for around six weeks 
and, as there are storage capacity constraints, there will be a limited amount of product that is 
permanently lost.  
 
The impact on meat (beef and sheep) export is assumed to be significantly longer, as export 
restrictions in FMD-free trading partners may last up to 6-12 months.  Opportunities to divert 
exports to FMD-endemic markets is rather limited, as the total market size is relatively small, 
and export prices would suffer a significant decline.  In addition, the storage capacity for meat 
is constrained.  Based on consultations with industry experts, we assumed that about one 
month worth of meat can be stored either in cool stores or on the farms, and any further losses 
are permanent, but the actual impact would depend on when it occurred in the growing 
season. 
 
In terms of total export volumes of goods and services, these add up to a loss of 8 per cent on 
an annual basis.  Figure 1a illustrates the impact of the outbreak on dairy, meat and figure 1b 
on total export volumes. 
 































Export prices and the exchange rate 
 
The outbreak is assumed to result in a long-lasting decline in export prices, arising from 
several effects. Initially, export prices decline as a very limited amount of the meat products 
are diverted towards low-value FMD-endemic export markets, where prices are significantly 
lower than on our traditional markets. Secondly, even when the FMD-free markets reopen to 
New Zealand exporters, there would be a significant reputation loss, which would result in 
decline in the premium that New Zealand lamb and beef products currently enjoy on the 
European and other markets. All in all, we assume that prices would begin to return towards 
baseline after 6 quarters, but would not reach their baseline level until at least 4 years. 
 
















While the sign of the exchange rate shock is clear, the magnitude is very difficult to estimate 
with any certainty.  However, it is likely that there would be a large initial drop in the New 
Zealand dollar, in the order of around 20 per cent in the first quarter.  The exchange rate is 
expected to remain below the baseline for around two and a half years. 
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Risk premium, business confidence and wealth 
 
We have assumed a 50 basis point increase in the risk premium on New Zealand dollar assets, 
as a result of foreign investors becoming more reluctant to invest in New Zealand in times of 
high uncertainty.  
 
Our assumptions also include a temporary downturn in business confidence, which has the 
effect of reducing investment in productive capacities. The loss of investment is assumed to 
result in a permanent decline in the capital stock and the long-term potential output of the 
economy.  However, the significant monetary policy easing helps to underpin confidence 
after the initial shock. 
 
Finally, we have assumed that reduction in the wealth of the households, which in turn causes 
a deterioration of the net foreign asset position of the country by 2.5 per cent.  
 
 
Impact of the shock on the key macro variables 
 
On the basis of the assumptions discussed above, the following section discusses the reaction 
of the key model variables.  
 
Output and employment 
 
The shock reduces the real GDP of the New Zealand economy by 4 percent relative to the 
potential output in the first quarter of the shock.  The recovery of the output happens within 5 
quarters, with a modest bounce-back above the potential output occurring after that period.  In 
terms of nominal GDP, the cumulative loss is around 6 billion dollars in the first year, rising 
up to 10 billion dollars by the second year.  A significant part of the loss in terms of nominal 
GDP occurs as a result of lower inflation.  Also, as we assumed a permanent decline in 
potential output, the accumulated nominal GDP loss (relative to the no-FMD case) continues 
to increase as time passes. 
 5 
The outbreak also causes a reduction in jobs. According to our model, unemployment would 
rise by 1 per cent and would be above its baseline for about two years.  This corresponds to 
around 15000-20000 jobs.  However, it may be that this is a point where the model may 
underestimate somewhat the potential impacts of the shocks, as it is designed to capture 
economy-wide fluctuations rather than sector-specific shocks.  It is, however, designed to 
capture the confidence of economic agents in the economy, and the sharp, but temporary, 
nature of the shock may mean that the employment impact is rather muted.  If farms and 
employers in the related industries expect a longer lasting decline in output than the one 
currently assumed, then the number of layoffs would be significantly higher.  
 
Inflation, interest rates and monetary policy 
 
As a result of the significant decline in aggregate demand, inflation would fall by around 1.5 
percentage points, despite the large depreciation of the exchange rate.  As the exchange rate 
shock is temporary, we do not expect a significant pass-through to tradable price inflation. 
The monetary policy reaction function embedded in FPS suggests a cut in the OCR of around 
200-250 basis points in each of the first two quarters after the initial outbreak, and a gradual 
tightening after that.  As a result, the 90-day interest rates would bottom around 1-2 per cent. 
Long-run real interest rates would decline by around 50 basis point, where the increase 
caused by the higher risk premium would be counter-balanced by the effects of monetary 
policy easing. 
 
Real investment and international investment position 
 
Another implication of the outbreak is a decline in investment. At the model’s time horizon, it 
not only means firms delaying investment, but also some firms cancelling investment 
projects.  On the short run, this results in a 20 per cent drop in investments, where on the long 
run the investment is around 6 per cent below the baseline.  As a consequence, the level of 
both permanent potential output and the capital stock are lower than their baseline for a 
relatively long period of time.  
 
As a result of the assumed decline in household wealth, a net decline of 2.5 per cent in the net 
foreign assets can be expected. Combined with the effect of the fall in export prices and 
volumes, an additional overseas borrowing of 8 billion dollars would be necessary.  
 
 
Fiscal policy response 
 
The fiscal scenario for a Foot and Mouth disease outbreak presented in this section is based 
upon the economic scenario provided by the Reserve Bank. Consequently, the fiscal estimates 
reflect the magnitude of the impact of an outbreak encapsulated in that economic scenario.  
 
The impact of a Foot and Mouth disease outbreak on the Crown’s overall fiscal position is 
likely to be significant. Both revenue and expenditure tracks are forecast to deteriorate for 
several years following the outbreak. This scenario has assumed that revenue policies are 
unchanged and that the change in expenditure policy is limited to meeting operational, 
compensatory and welfare spending, which current legislation provides for. Reductions in the 
operating balance would lead to increasing gross and net debt.  6 
 
Percentage point change in key variable to GDP ratios under the FMD scenario 
  02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 
Revenue -0.6% -1.1%  -0.5% -0.7% -0.3% 0.0% 0.1%  0.1% 
Expenses 1.4% 1.5%  0.9% 1.0% 1.3% 1.5% 1.7%  1.9% 
Operating 
balance  -2.0% -2.6% -1.4% -1.7% -1.6% -1.4% -1.6% -1.8% 
Gross debt  3.1% 5.9%  6.5% 8.4% 9.8% 11.0% 12.5%  14.1% 
Net debt  2.7% 5.4%  6.2% 8.0% 9.4% 10.6% 12.0%  13.5% 
 
In estimating the fiscal impact of a foot and mouth disease outbreak it is necessary to separate 
out the effects on revenue from those on expenditure. Direct spending resulting from the Foot 
and mouth outbreak itself, which is proportional to the number of farms affected, dominates 
the expenditure track in this scenario because of the small size of the assumed increase in 
unemployment. The impact on revenue will have a weaker link to the magnitude of the 
outbreak, but will be affected by the length of time trade restrictions are placed on New 
Zealand agricultural products by other countries, during which agricultural firms are unable to 
undertake normal operations.  
 
 




The Treasury Tax Forecasting team undertook explicit forecasts of the impact on tax revenue 
out to March 2006. Based on the economic tracks provided by the Reserve Bank, they 
estimate the following impact on the tax take:  
 
Year  ended  March-03 March-04 March-05 March-06 












Significant lags exist in the estimated impact of a foot and mouth disease outbreak on the tax 
profile. This is a result of both timing issues with the payment of taxes and a cumulative 
effect in the tax-forecasting model as the tax payments expected increase off the previous 
years level.   
 
The long-term fiscal model also estimates the likely decline in earnings by Crown entities and 




One-off Government expenditure of $200 million has been assumed in 2002/03. This is more 
than sufficient to cover operations and compensation provisions set out in the Bio-security 
Act 1996 and the establishment of a “Special assistance to the Rural sector” programme, as 
provided for under the Social Security Act 1964.  
 
The fiscal model makes appropriate adjustments in expenditure for those costs related to the 
economic outlook such as unemployment benefit payments and financing costs. All other 








The hypothetical foot and mouth outbreak would have a significant impact upon the Crown 
operating balance.  The fall in the operating balance to a low of –0.4% of nominal GDP in 
2003/04 is due to both a decline in Government revenue and increased spending. Crown 
revenue would be expected to decline by approximately 1.1% of GDP in 03/04 returning to 
comparable levels to the base case scenario in 2007/08
4.  Crown expenditure is estimated to 
increase by 1.5% of GDP in 2003/04 compared to the base case scenario. Higher 
unemployment and financing costs, combined with lower nominal GDP, cause expenditure as 
a proportion of GDP to be persistently above the level of the base scenario. Overall, the 
operating balance estimate under the foot and mouth outbreak scenario remains significantly 





                                                 
4 This result is reflective of the change in assumptions made to return the tax to GDP ratio to more “normal” 



















Sovereign issued gross debt 
 
The reduction in operating balances throughout the forecast and projection period reduces the 
availability of funds for debt repayment, while operating deficit in 02/03 and 03/04 increase 
the requirement for borrowed funds.  The loss of operating surpluses reduces the 
Government’s ability to maintain the forecast gross debt levels, which increase to 38.3% of 






Reflecting the significant increase in gross debt, net debt rises to 25.6% of GDP in 2009/10, 
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